UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/560,650	05/09/2006	David B. Weiner	UPAP0020-100	2255
34137 Pepper Hamilto	7590 04/07/201 n LLP	EXAMINER		
400 Berwyn Par	rk	SHEN, WU CHENG WINSTON		
899 Cassatt Road Berwyn, PA 19312-1183			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
•			1632	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			04/07/2010	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/560,650	WEINER ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	

	WO SHERE WHISTON SHER	1002
The MAILING DATE of this communication ap	pears on the cover sheet with the	correspondence address
THE REPLY FILED <u>22 March 2010</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS.	APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR	ALLOWANCE.
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or application, applicant must timely file one of the followin application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Application (RCE) in compliance with 3 periods:	ng replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi opeal (with appeal fee) in compliance	t, or other evidence, which places the with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expiresmonths from the mai	ling date of the final rejection.	
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.0	e later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	g date of the final rejection.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The dath have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office la may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704 NOTICE OF APPEAL	extension and the corresponding amount e shortened statutory period for reply origi ter than three months after the mailing dat	of the fee. The appropriate extension fee nally set in the final Office action; or (2) as
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in confiling the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any ex Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed AMENDMENTS	tension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a
3. ☐ The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection	but prior to the date of filing a brief	will not be entered because
(a) They raise new issues that would require further (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE be	consideration and/or search (see NO	
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in bappeal; and/or	•	ducing or simplifying the issues for
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a		ected claims.
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1	• •	mpliant Amendment (PTOL-324).
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection		,
<ol> <li>Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be non-allowable claim(s).</li> </ol>	•	timely filed amendment canceling the
7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a how the new or amended claims would be rejected is p The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed:		l be entered and an explanation of
Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: <u>1,14-17,19,55-60,66-71 and 77</u> . Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: <u>38,64 and 75</u> .		
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE		
8. The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, because applicant failed to provide a showing of good a was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).		
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filir entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necess</li> </ol>	o overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fails to provide a
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explana REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	tion of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attached.
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered See Continuation Sheet.	but does NOT place the application ir	n condition for allowance because:
<ul><li>12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i>(s</li><li>13. ☐ Other:</li></ul>	). (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)	

Continuation of 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):

- (I) Applicant's claim amendments filed on 03/22/2010 have overcome the rejection of claim 77 under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention, because the claim has been amended.
- (II) Applicant's claim amendments filed on 03/22/2010 have overcome the scope of enablement rejection of claims 21-23, 54, 61-63, 65, 72-74, and 76 under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, because these claims have been cancelled.

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

(I) Applicants request that the finality of the rejection be reconsidered and withdrawn. Applicant argues that the rejection as applied to claim 1 could have been applied to claim 1 prior to the amendment, and the amendment did not necessitate the new grounds for rejection. The rejected subject matter was included in claim 1 prior to the amendment and the rejection as currently applied could have been made earlier.

In response, Applicant apparently fails to understand, intentionally or unintentionally, the inclusion of claim 1 in the 103 rejection of claim 77 is due to the fact that claim 77 is dependent from claim 1. This is the standard format how a 103 rejection is constructed when there is only one 103 rejection or when the first 103 is formatted as "A in view of B" along with additional 103 rejections formatted as "A in view of B, and further in view of C". In this case, there is only one 103 rejection in the Final office action mailed on 01/22/2010, and claim 77 was filed AFTER the Non-Final office action mailed on 07/29/2008. Therefore, there is no double whatsoever that the rejection of claims 1 and 77 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yang et al. (Yang et al., Induction of potent Th1-type immune responses from a novel DNA vaccine for West Nile virus New York isolate (WNV-NY1999). J Infect Dis. 184(7):809-16, 2001) in view Letvin et al. (WO 99/16466, international publication date 04/08/1999), is NECESSITATED BY CLAIM AMENDMENTS FILED ON 01/29/2009. Furthermore, Applicant is reminded that claim 1 REMAINS rejected under multiple 102 rejections.

(II) Applicant's arguments have failed to overcome the rejection of claim 66 under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. Applicant's arguments filed 03/22/2010 have been fully considered and they are not persuasive. Previous rejection is maintained for the reasons of record advanced on page 4 of the office action mailed on 01/22/2010.

Applicant argues that the limitation of non-IgE protein in claim 66 applies to the non-IgE protein in claim 1. While claim 1 itself includes two alternative limitations, i.e. a non-IgE protein from the same species as the IgE signal peptide or a non-IgE protein that is one of several expressly recited immunomodulatory proteins, the additional limitation in claim 66 is clear in indicating that the non-IgE protein that is from the same species as the IgE signal peptide is an immunomodulatory protein or the non-IgE protein is one of several expressly recited immunomodulatory proteins without limitation to whether or not it is from the same species. Therefore, Applicant asserts that claim 66 is clear and definite.

In response, claim 66 depends from claim 1 and recites the limitation "wherein the non-IgE protein is an immunomodulating protein". It is unclear "the non-IgE protein" recited in claim 66 is referring to "a non-IgE protein sequences" recited in lines 3-4 of claim 1 or referring to "a non-IqE protein sequences" recited in lines 6-7 of claim 1. In latter scenario, lines 7-8 of claim 1 had been amended to recite additional limitation "wherein the non-IgE protein is an immunomodulating protein selected from the group considting of ---", thereby, claim 66 simultaneously recites two distinct scopes of "a/the non-lgE protein sequences".

(III) Applicant's arguments have failed to overcome the rejection of claims 1, 14-17, 19, 55-60, and 66-71 under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and 102(e) as being anticipated by Weiner et al. (US 2002/0123099, A1, Publication date Sep. 5, 2002). Applicant's arguments filed 03/22/2010 have been fully considered and they are not persuasive. Previous rejection is maintained for the reasons of record advanced on pages 14-17 of the office action mailed on 01/22/2010.

Applicant argues that the West Nile virus capsid protein taught by Weiner et al. does not anticipate either the limitation (i) "a nucleic acid sequence that encodes a fusion protein that consists of a non-IgE protein sequences linked to an IgE signal peptide that is from the same species as the non-IgE protein" or the limitation (ii) "a nucleic acid sequence that encodes a fusion protein that consists of a non-IgE protein sequences linked to an IgE signal peptide, wherein the non-IgE protein is an immunomodulating protein selected from the group consisting of cytokines, chemokines, cellular death receptors, cellular adhesion molecules, cellular growth factors, cellular growth factor receptors, protein kinases and enzymes or functional fragment thereof" are two different nucleic acids that can be selected from to be the claimed "isolated nucleic acid" recited in claim 1.

In response, the limitation "from the same species as the non-IgE protein" recited in claim 1 certainly encompasses "obtained from the same species as the non-IgE protein". Applicant is reminded that a virus cannot express viral genes outside of host cells and the viral proteins must be synthesized in the host cells and obtained from the host cells. Therefore, the Examiner maintains the position that the West Nile virus capsid protein taught by Weiner et al. DOES anticipate the limitation "a nucleic acid sequence that encodes a fusion protein that consists of a non-IgE protein sequences linked to an IgE signal peptide that is from the same species as the non-IgE protein".

(IV) Applicant's arguments have failed to overcome the rejection of Claims 1, 14, 16, 17, 19, 55, 56, 58-60, 66, 67, and 69-71 under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by Yang et al. (Yang et al., Induction of potent Th1-type immune responses from a novel DNA vaccine 184(7):809-16, 2001). Applicant's arguments filed 03/22/2010 have for West Nile virus New York isolate (WNV-NY1999). J Infect Dis.

been fully considered and they are not persuasive. Previous rejection is maintained for the reasons of record advanced on pages 17-20 of the office action mailed on 01/22/2010.

Applicant's arguments and Examiner's Response to Applicant's arguments are the same as documented in the maintained rejection of claims 1, 14-17, 19, 55-63, and 66-71 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and 102(e) as being anticipated by Weiner et al. (US 2002/0123099, A1, Publication date Sep. 5, 2002).

(V) Applicant's arguments have failed to overcome the rejection of claims 1, 14, 16, 17, 19, 55, 56, 58-60, 66, 67, and 69-71 under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by Yang et al. (Yang et al., Induction of inflammation by West Nile virus capsid through the caspase-9 apoptotic pathway. Emerg Infect Dis. 8(12):1379-84, 2002). Applicant's arguments filed 03/22/2010 have been fully considered and they are not persuasive. Previous rejection is maintained for the reasons of record advanced on pages 20-22 of the office action mailed on 01/22/2010.

Applicant's arguments and Examiner's Response to Applicant's arguments are the same as documented in the maintained rejection of claims 1, 14-17, 19, 55-60, and 66-71 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and 102(e) as being anticipated by Weiner et al. (US 2002/0123099, A1, Publication date Sep. 5, 2002).

(VI) Applicant's arguments have failed to overcome the rejection of claims 1 and 77 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yang et al. (Yang et al., Induction of potent Th1-type immune responses from a novel DNA vaccine for West Nile virus New York isolate (WNV-NY1999). J Infect Dis. 184(7):809-16, 2001) in view Letvin et al. (WO 99/16466, international publication date 04/08/1999). Applicant's arguments filed 03/22/2010 have been fully considered and they are not persuasive. Previous rejection is maintained for the reasons of record advanced on pages 22-27 of the office action mailed on 01/22/2010.

Applicant argues that to combine Yang 1 and Letvin to produce the claimed invention as suggested in the Office Action, one skilled in the art would insert the IL-15 coding sequences in place of the West Nile Virus capsid protein sequence. The resulting construct however would comprise an IgE signal peptide linked to an IL-15 protein that contains its own signal peptide. One skilled in the art would not produce such a construct because one skilled in the art would not include two signal peptides in view of the combined teachings. Such a construct is not obvious.

In response, as stated in the maintained rejection for the reasons of record advanced on pages 22-27 of the office action mailed on 01/22/2010, it would have been prima facie obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to combine the teachings of Yang et al. regarding a recombinant DNA vaccine, a plasmid construct, as a pharmaceutical composition comprises a nucleic acid sequence encoding the human immunoglobulin secretory leader signal (See slg leader, indicated in Figure 1A, Yang et al., 2001, and the plasmid map provided below) fused West Nile Virus (WNV) capsid protein (Cp), with the teachings of Letvin et al. regarding the use of plasmid-expressed cytokine IL-15 as a strategy for amplifying immune responses elicited by plasmid DNA vaccines, to arrive at claim 77 of instant application by substitution of WNVCp encoding sequences taught by Yang et al. with IL-15 coding sequence and fused to slg leader in the context of the plasmid taught by either Yang et al. (2001) or Letvin et al. (1999).

One having ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Yang et al. and Letvin et al. because Letvin et al. specifically teaches the expression of cytokines, including IL-15 and IL-2, as a strategy for amplifying immune responses elicited by plasmid DNA vaccines.

Applicant is reminded that claim 77 recites "functional fragment thereof" IL-15. Substitution (or combination) of one signal peptide with another signal peptide to test functionality of a signal peptide (or signal peptides) of interest is certainly a routine optimization for desired expression level, which is well-know to a skilled artisan. In this regard, Applicant's attention is directed to MPEP 2144.05.

2144.05 [R-5] Obviousness of Ranges

See MPEP § 2131.03 for case law pertaining to rejections based on the anticipation of ranges under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 35 U.S.C. 102/103.

## II. OPTIMIZATION OF RANGES

A. Optimization Within Prior Art Conditions or Through Routine Experimentation Generally, differences in concentration or temperature will not support the patentability of subject matter encompassed by the prior art unless there is evidence indicating such concentration or temperature is critical. "[W]here the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation." In re Aller, 220 F.2d 454, 456, 105 USPQ 233, 235 (CCPA 1955) (Claimed process which was performed at a temperature between 40°C and 80°C and an acid concentration between 25% and 70% was held to be prima facie obvious over a reference process which differed from the claims only in that the reference process was performed at a temperature of 100°C and an acid concentration of 10%.); see also Peterson, 315 F.3d at 1330, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 ("The normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages."); In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 160 USPQ 809 (CCPA 1969) (Claimed elastomeric polyurethanes which fell within the broad scope of

the references were held to be unpatentable thereover because, among other reasons, there was no evidence of the criticality of the claimed ranges of molecular weight or molar proportions.). For more recent cases applying this principle, see Merck & Co. Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 10 USPQ2d 1843 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 14 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997). B. Only Result-Effective Variables Can Be Optimized A particular parameter must first be recognized as a result-effective variable, i.e., a variable which achieves a recognized result, before the determination of the optimum or workable ranges of said variable might be characterized as routine experimentation. In re-Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977) (The claimed wastewater treatment device had a tank volume to contractor area of 0.12 gal./sg. ft. The prior art did not recognize that treatment capacity is a function of the tank volume to contractor ratio, and therefore the parameter optimized was not recognized in the art to be a resulteffective variable.). See also In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 205 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1980) (prior art suggested proportional balancing to achieve desired results in the formation of an alloy).

With regard to asserted requirement for a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation, the Examiner would like to direct Applicant's attention to recent decision by U.S. Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. that forecloses the argument that a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation is an absolute requirement to support a finding of obviousness. See recent Board decision Ex parte Smith, --USPQ2d--, slip op. at 20, (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. June 25, 2007) (available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/prec/fd071925.pdf) (citing KSR, 82 USPQ2d at 1936). The Examiner notes that in the instant case, even in the absence of recent decision by U.S. Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the suggestion and motivation to combine Yang et al. (2001) and Letvin et al. (1999) have been clearly set forth above in this advisory action and in the maintained rejection of the Final office action mailed on 01/22/2010.

It is noted further noted that one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

/Wu-Cheng Winston Shen/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1632